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Abstract: Iceland’s and Ireland’s banking crises since 2008 provide good examples of credit-
induced collapses. While traditional Austrian Business Cycle Theory emphasizes central bank 
induced low interest rates as the origin of crisis, this paper focuses on two different instigators 
using the Icelandic and Irish collapses as narratives. First, the artificial reduction in risk through 
Iceland’s comprehensive deposit insurance plan fueled the króna carry trade throughout the early 
2000s, helping to spur a debt-based expansion. Second, the reduction in risk upon accession to 
the Eurozone increased foreigners’ willingness to invest in Ireland. Higher Irish inflation rates 
until normalization with core European countries also created higher risk-adjusted returns for 
foreigners to invest in Ireland. These two factors compounded the lax monetary policies of the 
central banks of Iceland and Europe and elevated the propensities to take on risk and debt in both 
countries, thus instigating Austrian-type business cycles. 
  
                                                 
1
 This paper builds off and extends arguments made in Howden (2012b). Research funding was 
generously provided by the Mercatus Center. I would like to thank Devin Bowen for excellent 
research assistance, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.  
The Icelandic and Irish Banking Crises: 
Alternative Paths to a Credit-Induced Collapse  
 
Introduction 
Standard illustrations of an Austrian Business Cycle (ABC) center on a central bank controlled 
money supply being expanded so as to lower the market rate of interest below its natural (i.e., 
savings and investment determined) level. The result is a discoordination between consumption, 
savings and investment manifested in two forms: malinvestment along the temporal structure of 
production and/or overconsumption. (Hayek (1935) focuses on the former, while Mises (1949) 
and Garrison (2000) utilize a combination of the two.) While this approach has wide appeal 
based on its use of “the” interest rate as a general cause of economic downturns, it suffers from 
its near-exclusive focus on the central bank controlled money supply as the unique source of the 
artificially low interest rate.  
 This paper uses the recent banking crises of Iceland and Ireland to demonstrate that while 
centralized monetary authorities can create artificially low interest rates via monetary expansion, 
this is not the sole method. Both countries are compelling cases for examination as the extent of 
their recessions is formidable. Ireland’s main stock index, the ISEQ, fell nearly 80 percent 
between 2007 and 2008, while Iceland’s OMXI15 collapsed over 97 percent.  Per capita GDP in 
Iceland declined 30 percent from peak to trough, with Ireland falling 12 percent over the same 
period. (The equivalent decline the United States was about 5 percent.) The use of these 
countries is also appealing as their crises offer similar symptoms – large buildups of debt that 
propagated speculative banking activity and unsustainable consumption patterns. These two 
countries are also interesting as their debt buildups have several common denominators: 
increases in the money supply, inflation and low real interest rates enticed what are now 
identified as excess debt levels. A general theory, such as ABC theory, is useful to explain why 
these disruptions to the money-side of the economy trigger such widespread effects. By focusing 
on changes to risk perceptions in each economy we are able to illustrate that the general theory 
holds true with less onus placed on the central bank. In this way, the present work is influenced 
by Cowen (1997, especially chap. 3), who phrases a traditional Austrian business cycle in terms 
of increased risk-taking through manipulations to the natural rate of interest.  
 In particular, I will contrast three sources of disruption on the money-side of the economy 
that promoted debt buildups in each country. First, and consistent with the traditional exposition 
of an ABC, I will explore what role each country’s central bank had in setting interest rates too 
low and expanding their money supplies too quickly to be sustainable. Second, I will assess the 
assets that banks in each country focused their investment activities in – equity in Iceland versus 
real estate lending in Ireland. Finally, I will discuss the guarantees secured by governmental or 
institutional arrangements that skewed risk perceptions and led to artificially high risk-adjusted 
returns. I conclude by giving a summary view of the effects of these three disruptions, and why it 
is important that Austrian Business Cycle theorists move towards giving a more holistic account 
of crises that includes these additional factors.  
 
The Lead up to Iceland’s Bust 
 
 
When the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) floated the króna in March 2001, it also adopted an 
inflation-targeting regime. Under this regime, the CBI targeted yearly consumer price inflation of 
2.5 percent. Despite this target,  Iceland’s annual inflation rate averaged 4.7 percent from 2001 to 
2006  and peaked at of 9.4 percent in 2007. By its own admission, the CBI had done an 
unsatisfactory job at targeting inflation over this period (Central Bank of Iceland 2007: Box I-2). 
Part of this error can be explained by a faulty inflation-targeting model (as discussed in Bagus 
and Howden 2011: 16-18) and part by the large influx of foreign bank funding.2 With inflation 
remaining above target for most of the early 2000s, artificially low real interest rates spurred 
domestic borrowers to take on increasing amounts of debt. 
 The CBI’s monetary expansion had the two-fold effect of increasing inflation while 
simultaneously holding nominal interest rates low. This interest rate policy did not just affect 
domestic borrowing – it also filtered through to foreign lenders. By 2005, the Icelandic banks 
had more-or-less exhausted the amount of domestic funds that the approximately 320,000 
Icelandic residents could deposit in the narrow banking system or invest in the broader financial 
sector (Portes and Baldursson 2007: 36-38; Jónsson 2009: 107-112). In a bid to continue 
financing their expanding operations Icelandic banks turned to foreign depositors seeking higher 
interest rates than their own countries provided. These nominal interest rates may have been low 
by Icelandic standards, but were high compared to other countries’. This disparity can be partly 
explained by a lower inflation premium on borrowing in other countries, especially within the 
core of Europe. 
While high inflation and low real interest rates incentivized Icelanders to borrow funds 
instead of loaning money to the banking system, the same did not hold true for foreigners. A 
foreign lender is not concerned with Icelandic inflation (except through effects on the exchange 
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 There is also evidence that the CBI lowered its key interest rate in 2001 in response to pressure 
from the Icelandic government (Report of the Special Investigation Commission: chapter 21, p. 
27). The CBI estimates that Icelandic nominal interest rates were set more than 4 percent below 
that suggested by its own Taylor rule. This gap persisted until midway through 2004, at which 
time the increase in interest rates by the CBI (by almost 8 percent over two years) normalized its 
target rate with the projected Taylor rule target (Central Bank of Iceland 2007). 
rate); his focus is centered only with his own domestic rate of inflation rate. High nominal 
Icelandic interest rates coupled with lower foreign inflation premia translated to high real returns 
for the foreign investor interested in lending money to an Icelandic financial institution. To the 
extent that higher Icelandic inflation would also depreciate the exchange rate, the expected return 
on a króna and home currency investment would be equalized for the foreigner. As we will see 
below, a robust carry trade maintained the króna’s strength and mitigated fears of depreciation, 
thus leading to above average risk-adjusted returns for foreigners investing in the Icelandic 
market.  
 
Icelandic Bank Operations 
Icelandic banks were able to enhance their credit-issuing capabilities through two changes that 
occurred in the 2000s. First, the internationalization of its financial markets allowed them to start 
seeking foreign retail funding after a long period of reliance on domestic deposits. Second, the 
banking system was able to enhance its credit issuing capabilities endogenously by investing in 
inflation-sensitive assets to finance external growth. This commonly resulted in equity-based 
bank assets, in contrast with the more usual financial position for banks with debt-based assets. 
By not only holding assets in the form of loans but also taking a position in the equity of 
companies, the Icelandic banks realized significant returns on their assets from 2000 until 2007.3 
By 2006, 80 percent of bank income came from gains on assets in distinction from the more 
usual interest income from loan portfolios (Figure 1). This enabled them to increase their 
liabilities commensurately without endangering their liquidity, primarily by increasing the 
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 None of the big three Icelandic banks had a return on equity of less than 24 percent for the 
years 2006 and 2007 (Portes and Baldursson 2007) 
money supply. In 2004 and 2005, bank investments in equities grew by 57.5 percent and 24.7 
percent (Report of the Special Investigation Commission 2010: chap. 21). External growth was 
strong from 2004-07, with Icelandic outward investment hovering around 33 percent of its GDP 
in each of these years (Portes and Baldursson 2007: 39). Internal growth comprised the bulk of 
the banking system’s growth from 2006 to the crash. The primary driver of this growth was by 
expanding on these previously undertaken equity activities, usually by decreasing the quality of 
the investments made (Flannery 2009: Annex 3). 
 
Figure 1: Icelandic Banks’ Non-Interest Income as a Percent of Total Income  
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (n.d.) 
 
 
The market liberalizations of the late 1990s opened the Icelandic financial sector to the well-
established world of global finance. One way to look at the internationalization of Iceland’s 
financial arena is to look at the current account deficit that built steadily throughout the mid 
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2000s, peaking at nearly 20 percent of GDP in 2006 (Table 1). By the end of 2006, the net 
international investment position of Iceland was negative in the amount of 121.5 percent of GDP, 
also quite high by international standards (Portes and Baldursson 2007: 43-44).  
 
Table 1: Icelandic Trade Balance (percent of GDP) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
-7.3 -1.1 1.6 -3.1 -5.6 -12.3 -18.2 -10.7 -2.8 8.6 10.1 8.5 6.3 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (n.d.) 
 
 
Less risk-averse investors could invest directly in the Icelandic market via “Glacier Bonds”— 
króna-denominated bonds that were marketed directly to foreigners in a bid to attract foreign 
capital. Issuances of Glacier Bonds commenced in August 2005, and reached their peak in spring 
2007 with $6.3 billion of these bonds outstanding, equivalent to almost 40 percent of the 
country’s GDP (Bagus and Howden 2011: 63). 
High nominal interest rates spurred on by high levels of inflation coupled with a 
comprehensive deposit insurance scheme managed by the CBI incentivized banks to push into 
foreign markets to obtain lower-cost funding. In particular, online retail branches were set up in 
several European countries—notably the United Kingdom and the Netherlands—to attract 
foreign customers. These foreign retail deposit accounts offered foreigners the chance to 
capitalize on higher Icelandic interest rates in their own domestic currency thus eliminating the 
risk of an adverse foreign exchange movement. As an example, a Dutch saver could lend euros to 
an Icelandic subsidiary operating in the Netherlands. The Icelandic bank would convert these 
euros to króna, and pay the Dutch saver the higher interest rate made possible through the 
resultant króna investment. The Dutch saver was able to earn a rate of return closer to that of the 
króna investment, while the Icelandic bank used the less costly euros to fund Icelandic 
investment activities. 
 The Icelandic deposit insurance plan insured clients of the foreign branches of Icelandic 
banks, thus mitigating risk from the venture and enticing a steady flow of foreign retail deposits 
into the country. Icelandic banks lent these foreign-denominated funds directly to the Icelandic 
public at relatively low interest rates to finance consumption activities. (Bagus and Howden 
(2011: chap. 5) examine the overconsumption that resulted from these loans.) Foreign-
denominated mortgages to take advantage of lower international interest rates became common, 
with around 80 percent of all foreign-currency household lending made in low-interest Swiss 
franc– and Japanese yen–denominated mortgages (Buiter and Sibert 2008: 16).4 While Icelandic 
companies had high levels of foreign revenues that made paying these foreign-denominated 
liabilities less problematic (Mishkin and Herbertsson (2006) report that 78% of revenues from 
firms in Iceland’s main stock market index (OMX 115) were in foreign currency), households 
had limited access to foreign income to pay off their mortgages.  
Some of these incoming foreign funds were converted to króna to fund domestic asset 
purchases, in what is now the well-known króna carry trade – borrowing at low foreign interest 
rates to invest in higher yielding Icelandic investments. The conversion of this foreign funding to 
króna served an important purpose. The fresh demand for króna supported the exchange rate, 
mitigating any depreciation caused by the credit expansion (Report of the Special Investigation 
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 Iceland’s Housing Financing Fund, a state-operated facilitator of mortgage lending, also relaxed 
borrowing criteria in 2003. The maximum loan-to-value ratio was increased to 90 percent, and 
the maximum loan amount doubled, from 9.7 million kronur in 2004 to 18 million by 2006. 
Financing interest rates fell to 4.15 percent, their lowest level, for most of 2005 (Report of the 
Special Investigation Commission 2010: chap. 21: 25–26). 
Commission 2010: chap. 21: 30). As a consequence, Icelandic banks initially faced little 
exchange-rate risk due to reduced króna volatility.5 While this strategy reduced risk for Icelandic 
banks during the boom, it proved to be the country’s undoing when liquidity dried up. As 
foreigners started redeeming their deposits, Icelandic banks lacked sufficient foreign exchange 
reserves to meet these demands and began selling króna-denominated assets for foreign currency. 
This started a spiral in which depreciating pressure on the króna fueled increased asset sales to 
meet foreign redemption demands. 
 The Icelandic banking sector was ultimately exposed to two dangers. 
First, its liquidity, and eventually solvency, was reliant on equity prices. As a sizable 
portion of the banking system’s balance sheet was held in equity investments (Flannery 2009), 
any stock market decline hampered banks’ ability to meet redemption requests. The IMF 
characterized Icelandic deposit banks as more closely resembling investment banks for this 
reason. By 2006, 53 percent of banks’ operating profits came from capital gains and 
commissions from their equity portfolios, while only 41 percent came from more conventional 
(and safer) interest income (Tchaidze et al. 2007: 22). This situation was largely moot during the 
boom, as buoyant stock prices kept Icelandic banks well-capitalized and liquid relative to the 
banks of some larger, more stable countries, such as Germany (Figure 2).  
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 Implicit bailout guarantees by several international organizations, primarily the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), also served to reduce the volatility of smaller currencies, like the króna 
(Bagus and Howden 2011: chap. 3). Two risk reductions became apparent as the Fund increased 
the scope and frequency of its interventions. First, foreign investors became less concerned with 
sovereign insolvencies. Second, with bailouts more frequently forthcoming, foreign investors 
reduced the inflation premium on foreign currency investments as this option would be less 
resorted to by sovereigns nearing insolvency.  
Figure 2: Bank Capital to Assets Ratio (percent)6 
 
 
Source: World Bank (n.d.) 
 
Another common funding practice in Iceland was for two banks to swap their debt securities 
with each other to use as collateral in the Central Bank of Iceland’s funding facilities (Hreinsson 
et al. 2009: 44; Jännäri 2009: 18).7 While other banking sectors started shifting to more liquid 
assets as the crisis approached, Icelandic banks were caught amidst a collateral deficiency. 
Lacking sufficient assets to cover their increasingly requested liabilities, it was only the default 
and writing off of large numbers of non-performing assets that increased these banks’ liquidity 
and capital ratios. In contrast to their peers, Icelandic banks only appeared more liquid and better 
capitalized as the bust progressed due to the fact that their bad assets were mostly written off, 
and banks were eventually recapitalized by the IMF and fellow Nordic countries. Note that in 
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 Includes all equity and reserves as a percentage of total assets..  
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 Indeed, the Central Bank of Iceland was not the only institution to accept these swaps as 
collateral: the Eurosystem did as well (Hreinsson et al. 2009: 44; Sibert 2010). Flannery (2009: 
101) notes that such collateral amounted to nothing more than a “love letter.” 
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Figure 2, the dashed line between 2007 and 2009 represents the fact that the Icelandic banking 
system collapsed, effectively erasing all capital. As liabilities were written off and the foreign 
loans from Denmark, Norway, and the IMF started flowing into the country, the liquidity and 
capital positions of the banking system increased commensurately. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that this positive appearance could only occur after the collapse of the banking 
system erased many of its liabilities. 
The second aspect of the danger facing the Icelandic banking system was that by the end 
of the boom a growing portion of funding came from foreigners via foreign-denominated 
accounts, exposing banks to exchange-rate risk. As long as foreign depositors continued 
channeling funds into the Icelandic banks to exchange into króna, there was appreciating 
pressure on the króna. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the 
accompanying heightened awareness of international risk induced a flight to safety that included 
mass withdrawals from the Icelandic banks’ foreign branches. The Central Bank of Iceland 
lacked sufficient foreign-exchange reserves to meet these withdrawals or defend the currency. By 
2007 the banking sector held 14 times the central bank’s foreign reserves as foreign short-term 
liabilities (Gylfason 2008). In this way a run on foreign branches of Icelandic banks put in 
motion a currency crisis that endangered the banking system’s solvency. 
 
 
Icelandic Exchange Rate Stabilization 
With an independent central bank and an autonomous monetary policy, Iceland was in no 
position to offer foreign investors a credible risk reduction in terms of inflation and exchange-
rate risk. Attractive Icelandic interest rates were a product of high inflation. This feature would 
normally depreciate the króna and temper the expected returns of foreign investors´ króna assets. 
Through a stroke of fortune, the large quantity of króna carry trade temporarily kept the currency 
strong and stable, thus reducing investors’ fears that they would suffer an adverse exchange rate 
shock. Indeed, The Economist’s Big Max Index ranked the króna as the most over-valued 
currency in the world on February 1, 2007. This state of affairs in Iceland was sustained by a 
tenuous foundation, and was secured by an accommodative but ultimately deficient deposit 
insurance plan. 
 The króna´s strength was maintained by a Ponzi scheme, and was driven largely by 
Icelandic banks making purchases using their foreign funding sources. The sustainability of the 
króna’s ascent required more foreign deposit inflows to enter the country each period than 
outflows. Provided that foreigners were willing to lend Icelandic banks more money than they 
withdrew, banks would have a net positive cash flow to convert to króna. As a consequence, 
exchange-rate risk was temporarily reduced and the fragility of this situation increased with each 
increase in foreign liabilities held by the Icelandic financial system. If foreign investors started to 
withdraw more funding each month than they deposited or lent, as started in late 2007 and 
accelerated throughout 2008, Icelandic banks would find themselves in a spiral of selling 
domestic assets in ever more desperate attempts to cover their foreign losses with a dwindling 
supply of domestic assets. 
 The Icelandic banking system´s generous and inclusive deposit insurance plan limited the 
downside risk to both domestic and foreign account holders. This plan had three important 
features: 1) it was managed by the Central Bank of Iceland, 2) deposits were guaranteed up to an 
unlimited amount, and 3) both domestic- and foreign-denominated deposits were covered. Each 
of these facets reduced risk for depositors and enticed funding inflows in search of above-
average risk-adjusted returns. The latter two points also reduced depositor monitoring of banking 
practices (Howden 2013), while the first point legislatively put the onus on the CBI, an 
institution poorly incentivized to promote financial stability. 
 In the absence of a deposit insurance plan, depositors monitor banks to ensure that their 
lending practices are sufficiently prudent. This enforcement mechanism arises as depositors 
entrust their cash holdings to a bank, and its liquidity affects their ability to withdraw in a timely 
manner (and the bank’s solvency affects their ability to withdraw their money at all). Most 
deposit insurance plans have a legal maximum insurable amount to limit the obligation that the 
insurer will have to pay out in the event of insolvency, and also to entice large depositors to act 
as a secondary monitoring mechanism on the banks. By insuring deposits without limit, the 
Central Bank of Iceland exposed itself to unlimited liability, and also removed one set of 
monitors from the banking sector. 
 Deposit insurance plans also mitigate losses by insuring deposits made in only the 
domestic currency. This is because insuring foreign-denominated deposits implies that foreign 
exchange reserves will need to be made available to settle claims. The denomination of the 
insured deposits is important as it tempers what type of depositor will use the banking system, 
and also defines the insurer’s risk. 
 By offering foreign-denominated deposit insurance, there was an ambiguity as to who 
was liable for Icelandic banks operating in foreign countries. One of the largest banks in Iceland, 
Landsbanki, operated an online retail bank, Icesave, in the United Kingdom. As it was operated 
as a branch and not as a legally independent subsidiary, deposit insurance for Icesave was the 
responsibility of the Central Bank of Iceland (Danielsson and Zoega 2011). British depositors, 
for their part, were not aware of the risk because as far as they were concerned, the CBI insured 
all deposits. Regulators in the United Kingdom were uninterested in the branch’s operations 
since it was presumed to be held accountable by the Icelandic authorities. 
When these foreign-operating branches, like Icesave, came under pressure in late 2008, it 
was soon clear that the Central Bank of Iceland held insufficient foreign reserves to honor 
foreign-denominated liabilities. The Icelandic Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund, which 
administered the deposit insurance, had only about €100 million of equity in late 2008, far from 
the €3.9 billion held with foreign branches of Icelandic banks and subject to insurance under the 
EU’s minimum deposit insurance directive (Benediktsdottir et al. 2011). When time came to 
exercise the deposit fund, its underfunded state caused not only financial volatility and losses, 
but legal repercussions that still reverberate today.8 
Deposit insurance plans are usually administered by the government. In the United States 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation operates under the Treasury as an independent 
agency. An explicit link to the government has some advantages over an insurance plan managed 
by a central bank. The first advantage comes in the form of the limitation that the budget 
constraint imposes on the Treasury. Governments generally have large, though binding, budget 
constraints. Funding must ultimately be provided through taxes, making taxpayers aware of the 
expenses that their government incurs. Central banks, because of their role as monopoly 
suppliers of money, face no explicit budget constraint. They can unilaterally increase their assets 
to fund such insurance claims by issuing liabilities in the form of nonredeemable currency. In 
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 Governments in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, and the Netherlands unilaterally enacted 
legislation to include these branches in their own deposits plans, under the pretext of protecting 
their own citizens from the Icelandic collapse. In August 2009 Iceland’s parliament approved a 
bill now known as the “Icesave Bill” that would pay the United Kingdom and the Netherlands $5 
billion to cover losses. On March 6, 2010, in its first referendum since 1944, the country voted 
93 percent in favor of rejecting the Icesave Bill (with 5 percent of ballots miscast). A second 
referendum on April 9, 2011, had the same result (though by a slimmer margin of 60 to 40 
percent in favor of rejecting the bill). The UK and the Netherlands are still seeking legal redress. 
this way, central banks face no explicit pressure to minimize the losses of their deposit insurance 
operations. 
The insurer of deposits is also tasked with regulating the financial system, or at least the 
deposit-taking part of it. Confronted by a real budget constraint, governments face the costly 
possibility that if they have to pay out a claim they will have to divert resources from elsewhere. 
A central bank faces no such threat. If a claim is made, it can issue currency to paper over the 
loss. In this sense, we can expect a deposit insurance plan in the hands of a government to take 
its role as regulator of the financial system more seriously than a central bank would.9 
The Central Bank of Iceland had little incentive to monitor its banking system. At the 
same time the central bank can only honor its deposits provided that they are denominated in a 
currency under its control. By late 2008, the CBI had only 3 percent of the foreign reserves 
necessary to honor all the foreign-denominated liabilities of the banking system (Bagus and 
Howden 2011: 101). Such a precarious position would necessitate a recapitalization of the 
central bank after only a minor loss of foreign assets, a situation that materialized in 2008.  
Lacking the foreign exchange reserves to guarantee the now-insolvent banking system, 
the CBI turned to the government for help in late 2008. As the banking sector´s assets were 
almost nine times the size of the country´s 2007 GDP (OECD 2009), the Icelandic government 
was largely powerless to aid the insolvent banking system.  Lacking the funds to save its 
financial system, and with larger countries focused on their own problems, the Icelandic 
government allowed its banking system to default on a large number of its obligations thus 
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 After stepping down as chairwoman of the FDIC, Sheila Bair’s “exit interview” with the New 
York Times demonstrates how aware she was of her role to protect taxpayers’ money and 
depositors (Nocera 2011). She was quite clear that the Fund is not an investment vehicle to put 
tax dollars at risk, nor does it exist for any role other than protecting depositors. To my 
knowledge, no such discussion is found among the regulators of Iceland’s deposit insurance plan.  
saving the sovereign from a commensurate default.  
 
 
The Lead up to Ireland’s Bust 
 
If Iceland´s crisis was mostly caused by domestic policies, Ireland´s was instigated primarily by 
European unification. Prior to entry to the Eurozone, Ireland’s nominal interest rate was an 
equilibrating force set endogenously in its economy and subject to influence by its national 
central bank. With the advent of the euro, this nominal rate was set exogenously and became a 
destabilizing mechanism. This occurred as the rate was set without heed to domestic Irish 
savings and investment demand conditions, or shocks affecting its economy. While the nominal 
rate set by the ECB moved qualitatively with the needs of the Irish economy, the large and 
sustained quantitative fall in this nominal rate had repercussions on the nation’s propensity to 
borrow (Honohan and Leddin 2005).  
 The depreciation of the Irish pound in 1986 started the economy down the path to 
sustainability in terms of low and stable inflation, and a balance of trade. Disequilbria during the 
1990s were solved primarily through exchange rate realignments within the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism. While still in control of its monetary policy throughout most of the 1990s, the 
central bank of Ireland was able to target a nominal interest rate aligned with what the Taylor 
Rule would suggest was prudent (Eleftheriou et al. 2006). Although adherence to the Taylor Rule 
does not rule out a savings-investment imbalance, it is the guide most commonly used by central 
bankers to assess the sustainability of their policies.10  
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 The Taylor Rule is a monetary-policy guideline that aims to balance inflation with output 
through the central bank’s policy rate.  The benchmark version of the rule states that the central 
bank’s target interest rate (e.g. the Federal Funds Rate in the U.S.) will equal 2 + the inflation 
rate + 0.5*( the inflation rate – 2) + 0.5*(the percent by which real GDP deviates from full-
employment GDP). While the Rule is currently the most commonly used guideline for monetary 
 Accession to the Eurozone upset this stability, as equilibrium could no longer be sought 
through flexible exchange rate adjustments and the nominal interest rate was no longer 
determined endogenously by domestic Irish affairs. From 2000 to 2005, the ECB’s target 
nominal interest rate for the aggregate Eurozone was regularly 1.5-2 percent lower than the 
Taylor rule suggested was appropriate for Ireland’s economy. Indeed, disaggregating the 
Eurozone into a “core” and “periphery” suggests that this target rate was set to equilibrate the 
core’s economies, with little heed to the periphery (Nechio 2011). Not only was the ECB’s target 
rate set below the periphery’s Taylor rule target from 2000 until 2008, during 2006 the 
divergence grew to over 5 percentage points. In sum, there is evidence that the interest rate set by 
the ECB was not in response to the economic realities of Ireland (Sharkah and Pawela 2010; 
Lane 2012).  
 
 
Irish Bank Assets 
Ireland’s funding sources were conventional by comparison to those of its Icelandic neighbor. 
Traditionally the country’s banks used the domestic deposit base to finance mortgage and 
commercial lending (Ó Gráda 2008). The asset side of the banking system’s balance sheet, 
despite ballooning in size, remained largely consistent in composition during the boom. Funds 
were used to finance Irish consumption and investment expenditures. The key difference during 
the boom was the source of this funding, and its amount.  
 Lenders are primarily concerned with the default risk, the nominal interest rate, and the 
                                                 
policy, it is not without its own shortcomings. Price stability from following an appropriately 
specified Taylor Rule, for example, still allows for relative price adjustments capable of 
triggering an ABC (Garrison 2006). 
relevant loss of purchasing power through inflation over the period of their investment. 
Accession to the Eurozone altered each of these factors, thus adjusting the cost of funding for 
Irish banks and the consequent availability of credit. 
 With exchange-rate risk removed from the profit calculus of other European investors, 
Ireland’s financial system witnessed a large influx of credit. Some of this funding was a positive 
development, in response to increasingly encouraging fundamentals—a low corporate tax policy 
attracted foreign investment, and an educated and English-speaking workforce provided an 
ample pool of employees to fuel these businesses (Powell 2003; Evans 2011). By 2007, 8.1 
percent of Ireland’s GDP flowed in through foreign direct investment, placing it behind only 
Austria and Spain as a recipient country of these funds in Europe. As in Iceland, much of this 
incoming credit was directed at unproductive sources. In contrast to Iceland, this influx of credit 
lacked one significant problem, as these liabilities were in the same denomination as the assets 
they purchased and investments they financed. 
 The sustainable flow of funding into Ireland—those funds entering the country to take 
advantage of the positive changes to the tax, regulatory, and demographic structure of the 
country—largely fueled employment growth. These funds were also largely secure. Ireland’s tax 
structure and educated employment base combination was so much more conducive to 
domiciling foreign subsidiaries than that of continental European countries that there was little 
fear the funding that accompanied these companies would swiftly shift to greener pastures. 
Those funds that came in due to a short-term imbalance in real interest rates within the Eurozone 
during its early years were less reliable. As they represented funds invested solely in a quest to 
seek out the highest risk-adjusted return, Ireland’s competitive advantage in securing these funds 
disappeared as the Eurozone matured. As real interest rates normalized with the rest of Europe, 
the flow of funds into Ireland slowed. A mere slowing of funding would not have instigated a 
credit crunch of the magnitude witnessed in 2008. Since the funding was used for nonproductive 
activities—in the sense that it created non-self liquidating debt through the construction of what 
proved to be unsalable real estate—the ability of borrowers to repay was hampered as credit 
continued flowing into the country. In the initial stages of the boom this was not problematic as 
the country had low debt levels. As borrowing continued, foreign investors were increasingly 
less likely to be repaid in full, and the flow of funding reversed outwards. 
Thus, not only did the flow of funds into Ireland slow as its maturity in the Eurozone 
harmonized its real interest rates with those of its peers, but in risk-adjusted terms it increasingly 
became an unattractive bet for foreigners. The vulnerability that pressured Ireland at the time was 
a banking sector with large overexposure to the domestic construction sector on its asset side, 
and an overreliance on interbank euro-borrowing on its liability side (Kelly 2009). This 
vulnerability became especially apparent in 2008 as housing projects that were previously 
generating income for their constructors went unsold, the ability to repay debt was hampered, 
and interbank lending slowed. 
An asset’s default risk comes from two sources. Explicitly there is the chance that lenders 
will not get their principle returned and implicitly there is the loss on the investment through a 
depreciation of the exchange rate (if the investor is foreign) or through a loss of purchasing 
power (if the investor is domestic). Upon Ireland’s accession to the Eurozone, European 
investors had their fears allayed that an adverse exchange rate movement would reduce their 
payoff. The risk premium on Irish (versus other European) bonds was reduced, increasing the 
demand by foreigners. As the ECB was modeled largely after the inflation-fighting German 
Bundesbank, investors previously wary of inflationary policies through the national banks could 
rest assured that a more prudently managed ECB would keep inflationary pressures at bay. 
 An increase in real interest rates for foreign borrowers of Irish debt resulted as a 
consequence of this reduced risk premium. Contrast the nominal interest rates, inflation, and real 
interest rates in Germany and Ireland, as seen in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Interest and Inflation Rates 
 
 Germany   Ireland 
  
10-year 
government bond Inflation 
Real interest 
rate   
10-year 
government bond Inflation 
Real interest 
rate 
2000 5.3 1.4 3.9   5.5 5.3 0.2 
2001 4.8 1.9 2.9   5.0 4.0 1.0 
2002 4.8 1.4 3.4   5.0 4.7 0.3 
2003 4.1 1.0 3.1   4.1 4.0 0.1 
2004 4.0 1.8 2.2   4.1 2.3 1.8 
2005 3.4 1.9 1.5   3.3 2.2 1.1 
2006 3.8 1.8 2.0   3.7 2.7 1.0 
2007 4.0 2.3 1.7   4.0 2.9 1.1 
Source: Eurostat (n.d.) 
 
A German can earn the nominal interest rate by investing in a German bund or an Irish bond. 
Nominal interest rates in Germany were lower than in Ireland, if mostly due to lower inflation (a 
condition that in equilibrium would yield equal real interest rates, and which the data show was 
almost the case by 2005). Yet the German investor with no exchange-rate risk was now free to 
lend money to the Irish borrower at the Irish interest rate, and was himself concerned only with 
the domestic German rate of inflation. In other words, a German would have expected to earn 
almost 0.2 percentage points more interest by investing in Ireland in 2002 than by keeping his 
money in Germany. The low interest rate environment created by the ECB magnified this 
advantage. Note that these 0.2 percentage points translate to a 5.2 percent increase over what the 
German could earn by investing his money domestically. As the European Monetary Union 
matured and culminated in the formation of the Single European Payments Area in early 2008, 
transaction costs on financial movements were reduced. Coupled with the reduction of default 
risk on inter-European sovereign debt, the home bias that defined European investment portfolios 
prior to the introduction of the Euro gave way to a “Euro bias” as cross-border capital flows 
rapidly moved to exploit arbitrage opportunities (Balli et al. 2010). 
Low real interest rates during the early 2000s were largely the result of factors outside of 
Ireland´s control. Irish accession to the euro occurred at the peak of the “Celtic Tiger” boom. The 
standard prescription for countries entering monetary unions under such conditions is for an 
appreciation of the exchange rate just prior to entry, such that any inflationary pressures in the 
economy are absorbed by the appreciation and not through the post-entry inflation rate. This was 
notably not the case with Ireland’s accession, thus resulting in an undervalued entry conversion 
rate of the Irish pound to the euro which contributed to inflationary pressures in Ireland in the 
early years of the Eurozone (Lane 2011: 26). The natural harmonization process upon accession 
to the Eurozone meant that Irish inflation was structurally higher than that of core European 
countries (e.g., Germany) for a considerable period (Table 2). Furthermore, due to strong foreign 
participation in its economy, inflationary pressure was greatly influenced by the value of the 
euro. As a result, during the euro depreciation from 1999 to 2002, Ireland experienced a positive 
shock and an inflow of investment, especially from the United States, that increased its inflation 
differential relative to the rest of the Eurozone (Honohan and Lane 2003). From 2000 to 2005, 
Irish inflation outpaced that of the rest of the Eurozone by 2 to 3 percent per year. Though this 
leveled off by 2005, Irish inflation still averaged about 0.5 percent higher than that of Germany 
and the UK until the crisis´ early stages in late 2007. The presence of inflation is significant as it 
reduces the real cost of borrowing and thus lowers the cost of issuing debt.11  With real interest 
rates hovering around zero for a decade, long-lived assets (such as residential property) became 
increasingly attractive. 
Core-European investors could seize on the real interest rate differential available by 
investing in Ireland with no fear that the country could one day exit the monetary union should 
the unsustainability of its boom be exposed. In effect, investors were able to get a free lunch—
high risk-adjusted returns by the core’s standards, with no risk that a future currency depreciation 
would diminish profits. 
Banks’ liabilities became increasingly dependent on the whims of foreigners as foreign 
funds continued flowing into Ireland. Assets were largely domestically based, especially in the 
context of financing real estate endeavors on the island. As with Iceland, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers compounded the apparent problem of an economy overly-dependent on debt financing. 
Foreigners commenced withdrawing their investment funds from Ireland, thus necessitating Irish 
banks to liquidate assets to fund their redemption requests. The plateauing of real estate prices 
exposed the over-leveraged nature of the banking system, and ultimately led to a real estate 
collapse as banks sought ways to fund their liabilities. Unlike in Iceland, a concerted effort to 
“save” the banks was forthcoming, though at the expense of indebting the Irish government, and 
ultimately its citizenry, far beyond what was foreseen even a short time prior.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 The use of these borrowed funds for domestic expenditure is more apparent if we track the 
growth of imports over time. Although Ireland has for some time recorded a balance of trade, in 
part due to foreign companies being attracted to the relatively low tax rate and well-educated 
labor pool, this balance steadily declined after the country’s accession to the monetary union. As 
recently as 2003 the country’s current account was in balance, though it steadily declined to 
nearly -6 percent by 2008 (Eurostat n.d.). This decline in the trade surplus in part demonstrates 
an increase in imports, especially in the form of consumption expenditures. 
Conclusion 
While it is conceptually easy to aggregate crisis-stricken countries into a homogenous group that 
experienced artificially low interest rates and excess credit creation, understanding some key 
institutional differences allows for a more fruitful analysis. This paper has used the recent cases 
of Iceland and Ireland to illustrate this point. Although both countries experienced a similar 
Austrian Business Cycle-type boom from the typical monetary causes, the specific factors 
propagating these monetary factors are quite distinct. 
Atypical for narratives of an ABC, this work has not looked at specific instances of 
malinvestment or overconsumption. (This task has been performed elsewhere, in Bagus and 
Howden (2011: chap. 5) for Iceland, and in Howden (2012a) for Ireland). Nor has it focused on 
the specific trigger that set in motion the collapses of late 2008. Readers familiar with Austrian 
Business Cycle theory will note the similarities between the present paper and other case studies. 
As in Rothbard (1963), I have only looked at the causes of the reduction of interest rates leading 
up the downturn in each of these countries. In particular, this paper has focused narrowly on 
alternative factors during the boom that served to entice lenders to accept lower risk-adjusted 
rates than would otherwise be deemed prudent (especially ex post facto). The most significant 
difference in the present exposition compared to more conventional narratives of Austrian-type 
business cycles is a shift away from central bank monetary policy as the sole cause of monetary 
disturbances to an emphasis on alternative factors.  
 In Iceland’s case, a recently independent central bank and a move to a flexible exchange 
rate allowed it to entice foreign investment. In particular, as Icelandic banks opened foreign 
branches they were able to attract new investment, which was then converted to local Icelandic 
króna. This process maintained the króna’s strength and diminished the expected foreign 
exchange risk that these investments entailed. Risk was further reduced through a comprehensive 
insurance guarantee on Icelandic deposits. This guarantee reduced the monitoring of the banking 
system by depositors as it lacked a maximum insurable amount and was extended to all foreign-
denominated deposits. The deposit insurance fund was itself backstopped by the Central Bank of 
Iceland creating no heed to a hard budget constraint because the CBI had the ability (in theory) 
to inflate its liabilities away. As foreign liabilities of the banking sector increased this policy 
option was removed. The banking system was increasingly exposed to a liquidity crisis as the 
boom progressed, and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 only exposed the previously 
unsustainable situation. 
 The unsustainability of the Irish situation is also attributable to its dependence on credit, 
though its origin is distinct. The debt buildup in Ireland was caused primarily by unequal 
inflation rates within the Eurozone. After accession to the euro in 1999 at an erroneously 
undervalued exchange rate, Irish inflation remained about 2 percentage points above the core of 
Europe for several years. As a result, it proved advantageous for core investors to invest their 
money at the higher nominal Irish interest rates caused by the inflation differential. With the 
common currency irrevocably in force, all exchange-rate risk was eliminated, offering a quick 
reduction in risk on cross-border transactions. Consequently, a large amount of foreign funding 
flowed into Ireland, dependent on a maintained inflation differential with the rest of Europe. As 
the Eurozone approached maturity and inflation and nominal interest rates begin to normalize 
across all countries, cross-border financial flows begin to slow. This decline in the flow of credit 
exposed the tenuousness of the Irish credit-based economy. Like its Icelandic counterpart, the 
credit freeze following the collapse of Lehman Brothers only reinforced a previously precarious 
situation. 
 These two cases serve a broader purpose than just being examples of credit-binges gone 
wrong. Their dependence on credit is illustrative for other countries as the global economy 
moves to recovery. A poorly designed deposit insurance system in Iceland, and poorly managed 
accession to the currency union for Ireland, each served to worsen a tenuous investment 
environment reliant on artificially low interest rates at the hands of their central banks. This 
combination laid the foundation for the unsustainable booms witnessed and the devastating crises 
that followed. While much attention is focused on sorting out these recessionary economies 
today, this article serves the purpose of illustrating specific causes to preemptively circumvent in 
the future to avoid a repeat of these a credit-induced boom-bust cycles. 
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